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I. Introduction
The consolidation of the law relating to the Continental Shelf following
the 1945 United States Proclamation on the Continental Shelf I encouraged 
many States to claim jurisdiction over the Shelf resources. In a number of cases 
these claims brought about boundary disputes 2• For a number of years most 
States chose to delimit their Shelf claims without delimiting the superjacent 
waters. By the late seventies however there was firm evidence to suggest that 
under customary law a coastal State had the right to claim an Exclusive Fish­
ery Zone (E.F.Z) up to 200-nautical miles (n.m.) in breadth. This develop­
ment was complemented by the practice of a growing number of States which 
supported or claimed an Exclusive Economic Zone (E.E.Z) j • This institu­
tion enabled the coastal State to claim inter alia sovereign rights for the pur­
pose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources 
up to 200-n.m. from the coast � 
, .
Proclamation with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea-bed of the Con­
tinental Shelf. 28 September, 1945 (New Directions in the Law of the Sea), VoL I (1973), 
pp. 106 et seq. 
Vide, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark, Netherlands v Germany)-
Judge-ment) Internacional Court of Justice (1.C.j.) (1969), pp. 1 ec. seq. 
For a comprehensi\'e study on the E.E.Z., \'ide Attard, D.J.: The Exclusive Economic Zone 
in International Law (Oxford U niYersity Press 1986 Publication). 
Vide, Article 56 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
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By 1982 the International Court of Justice was prepared to state in the 
Tunisia/Libya Shelf Judgment that the E.E.Z. "may be regarded as part of 
modern international law ........ '' '• . Indeed in the Malta/Libya Judgment 
the Court was prepared to go further:" It is in the Court's view incontestable 
that ....... the institution of the exclusive economic zone, with its rule on en-
titlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States to have be-
come part of customary law ........ '' 6 
It should be noted that whilst the E.E.Z. and the Shelf regimes cover 
the same seabed and subsoil, they are autonomous. A coastal St.tt:e's rights 
over its Shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any ex­
press proclamation ; . They are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state 
does not explore its Shelf or exploit its natural resources no one may undertake 
these activities without its express consent. With respect to the E.E.Z., the 
general view is that a coastal State's rights depend on express proclamat­
ion 8 Consequently whilst a Coastal State may have a Shelf without an 
E.E.Z., the converse is not possible. 
For several years, States did not feel the need to claim an E.E.Z. as they 
could rely on the E.F.Z. regime to exploit the living sources found in the 
waters above the Shelf. However with the improvements in marine technolo­
gy valuable resources, other than fisheries, (e.g. production of energy from 
the water, currents and winds) have become more readily available. This has 
encouraged States to declare an E.E.Z .. Furthermore, new resources have been 
discovered in the water column. Whilst it is still not technologically possible 
to exploit them on a commercial basis, it is envisaged that in the years to come 
the necessary technology will be developed. In this respect, one would do well 
to note the foresight demonstated by the United States. In 1983, it proclaimed 
an E.E.Z. (estimated to measure some 2,831,4000 - square nautical miles) ena­
bling it to control all resources found therein. In a Fact Sheet on the United 
States Oceans Policy issued by the White House dated March 10, 1983, it was 
stated that the E.E.Z. will give the United States 
'' in particular, new rights over all minerals ( such as nodules and 
sulphide deposits) in the zone that are not on the 
continental shelf but are within 200 nautical miles. Deposits of poly­
metallic sulphides and cobalt/manganese crusts in these areas have 
only been recently discovered and are years away from being com­
mercially recoverable. But they could be a major future source of 
strategic and other minerals important to the U.S. economy and 
security.'' ·• 
5. I.CJ. Reports (1982), para. 100. 
6. J.C.}. Report.• (1985), para. 34. 
7. Vide., e.g. Article 77 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
8. Attard op. cit. Chapter 3 Section 2. 
9. \'oluml' XXII International Legal Mataials (i978), p. 461. 
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It is therefore not difficult to understand why a large number of States, 
· including a number of maritime States, have felt the needto declare an E.E.Z.
Indeed by November 1985 there were some 69 States which had declared an
E.E.Z. 10 These claims were generally accompanied with delimitation
problems. In such cases the parties had a number of options. Where a She.If
boundary had already been established, the parties could agree to adopt that
boundary as their E. E. Z. boundary. In cases where no Shelf boundary had
been agreed upon, the parties could agree to establish two boundaries which
need not necessarily be coincidental. Another alternative would be that of es­
tablishing a single maritime boundary which would delimit the Shelf and the
E.E.Z. of the parties. This study is mainly concerned with the last alternative.
In the forthcoming Sections it is proposed to examine the solutions adopted
in the delimination disputes between Malta and Libya 11 , the United States
and Canada 12 , and Guinea-Bissau 13 • Reference will also be made to State
Practice on the matter 1• 
II. Malta/Libya Dispute
If one examines the history of the Malta/Libya dispute, it becomes evi­
dent that the main concern of the parties was the right to explore the Shelf 
and exploit its resources. It is significant that whilst the two States could not 
agree on the exploitation of the Shelf resources, they made substantial progress 
with respect to the exploitation of the living resources of the Shelfs superja­
cent waters 15 • Nevertheless Libya, early in the dispute, submitted a draft 
Special Agreement which referred specifically to the delimitation of the Shelf 
and the E.E.Z. 16 Malta did not agree with this proposal and wanted to res­
trict the Court's judgment to the delimitation of the Shelf 17 • In fact the 
1976 Special Agreement between the parties to refer their desputes to the In­
ternational Court only referred to the delimitation of the Shelf 18 • It should 
be pointed out that at the time of the 1976 Agreement none of the parties had 
declared an E.E.Z. 19 Indeed the precise juridical contents of the E.E.Z. 
regime was still not very clear 20• 
10. Vide, Annex I for a list of E.E.Z. claimants.
11 . Infra, Section II. 
12. Infra, Section III.
13. Infra, Section IV. 
14. Infra, Section V. 
15. Vide, e.g., the Agreement for the Setting up ofajoint fishing venture of June 10, 1975; 
and the Agreement on the establishment of a Maltese-Libyan fishing company of July 1978. 
16. Vide, Vol. I of the Memorial (April 26, 1983) submitted by Libya to the International
Court, pp. 66 . Vide also the Maltese Memorial (April 26, 1983) p. 26. 
17. Vide, Reply Ouly 12, 1984), p. 27 submitted by Malta.
18. Vide, Article I of the Special Agreement signed at Valletta on May 23, 1976. This Agree­
ment is reproduced in the International Court's judgment in Malta/Libya case, I.CJ. Reports 
(1985), para. 2. 
19. Vide, Reply Ouly 12, 1984), p. 27 submitted by Malta. 
20. Professor I. Brounlie in his Principles of Public International (3rd Edition, 1979) only con­
sidered the E.F.Z. to be part of customary law. However, he did indicate that the position 
may evolve. 
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III. The Gulf of Maine Judgement
In this section and the next, it is proposed to review the single maritime
boundary established in the Gul
f 
of Maine case and the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
case. In both cases, the parties requested the adjudicator to delimit by a single 
boundary the sea-bed and its superjacent waters. It is noteworthy that in both 
cases the adjudicators found no legal impediment to drawing a single bound­
ary nor did they find that the task requested was materially impossible 21 
On October 12, 1984, a special Chamber of the Internatiol Court deli­
vered its judgment in the Gulf of Maine Case between Canada and the United 
States 22· . This judgment, unlike those previously delivered by the Interna­
tional Court,did not relate exclusively to the Shelf, but to both the Shelf and 
the E.E.Z. The parties, in fact, requested the Chamber to draw a single mari­
time boundary which would be applicable to all aspects of the parties' jurisdic­
tion "not only jurisdiction as defined by international law in its present state, 
but also as it wil be defined in future." 23 
The Chamber interpreted the request to delimit the maritime boundary 
as one relating 
''to a delimitation between the different forms of partial jurisdic­
tion, i.e. the 'sovereign rights' which, under current international 
law, both treaty-law and general law, coastal States are recognized 
to have in the marine and submarine areas lying outside the outer 
limit of their respective territorial seas, up to defined limits.'' 24 
Whilst both parties claimed 200n-m. fishery zones, only the United States 
proclaimed an E.E.Z., which coincided with its fishery zone. 
The Chamber, like the International Court in the 1982 Tunisia/Libya 
Judgement 25· found that with regard to the shelf of the parties it had to "pro­
ceed without reference to any real factor of natural separation .... '' 26 It also 
found that even in the "water column", which covered the whole of the sea­
bed in question, there were no' ..... genuine, sure and stable "natural bound-
aries'' ....... ' !; • The said mass of water ''essentially possesses the same
character of unity and uniformity already apparent from an examination of
the sea-bed, ...... " 2M. Under these circumstances, the Chamber concluded
that there were "no geological, geomorphological, ecological, or other factors 
sufficiently important, evident and conclusive to represent a single, inconvert-
21. Vide. e.g .. the Judgement in the Gulf of Maine case, /.C.J. Reports (1984), para. 27. 
'22. l.C.J. Reports (1984). pp. 246 et seq. 
n. Ibid .. para. 26, 
2-l. Ibid .. para. 19. 
2:i. Ibid .. (1982). para. 68. 
2(>. Ibid .. (1984). para. -l7. 
27. Ibid .. para. 54. The U.S. had argued that there were three identifiable oceano­
graphic and t'rnlogical regimes in the "·aters of the area which were di,·ided by natural 
boundaries;Yide ibid .. para. 51 et seq. 
28. Ibid .. para. :i:i. 
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ible natural boundary. '' 29 
The Chamber then proceeded to review the rules of international law 
governing the dispute between the parties. On the basis of this review, it defined 
the said rules as follows: 
"( 1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or ad­
jacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. 
Such delimitation must be sougth and effected by means of an agree­
ment, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the 
genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, 
such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effect­
ed by recourse to a third party_possessing the necessary competence. 
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application
of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable
of ensuring with regard to the geographic configuration of the area
and other relevant cicumstances, an equitable result.'' :w 
In its effort to identify the applicable "equitable criteria" and "practi­
cal methods'', the Chamber could obtain no assistance from general customary 
law 
31 
• It, therefore, felt obliged to consider whether guidance could be
sought from the '' special international law'' in force between the parties 12 
It concluded that whilst the 1985 Shelf Convention was in force between the 
parties, its application was not mandatory as the dispute referred not solely 
to the delimitation of the Shelf but to a"maritime boundary concerning a much 
wider subject-matter ........ '' :n • Neither did the Chamber find it possible to 
accept the view that the "combined equidistance special circumstances rule", 
found in the said Convention :14, was customary international law r, 
The Chamber also examined whether there were any binding legal obli­
gations deriving from the conduct of the parties u; • The question had been 
argued at length between the parties. Howevr, the Chamber found it impossi­
ble to conclude from the said conduct that there was a binding legal obliga­
tion, in the parties bilateral relations, to make use of a particular delimitation 
method :s; 
In view of the abovementioned analysis, the Chamber felt it was not 
bound to apply particular criteria or use particular practical delimitation 
methods, but was free to consider the whole range of available possibilities and 
to select the criteria and method or combination of practical methods, the ap­
plication of which would lead to an equitable solution rn 
29. Ibid., para. 56.
30. Ibid., para. 112.
31. Ibid., para. 114.
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid., para. 124.
34. Art. 6. 
35. J.C.]. Reports (1984), paras. 122 - 125. 
36. Ibid .. para. 126 et seq. 
37. Ibid., para. 154.
38. Ibid., paras. 156, 191.
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With regard to the choice of the applicable criteria, the Chamber point­
ed out that the delimitation in question had a twofold objective, i.e. the delimi­
tation of the Shelf and the E.F.Z. 's. Consequently, it had to exclude those criter­
ia which were found to be typically and exclusively bound up with the particu­
lar characteristics of the sea-bed or the water column 39• Thus, for example, 
it noted the 
"difficulty, if not the impossibility, of adopting, for the purpose 
of such a dual delimitation, a criterion disclosed by objective anal­
ysis to be essentially ecological." 40 
The Chamber concluded: 
"in reality, a delimitation by a single line, such as that which has 
to be carried out in the present case, i.e., a delimitation which has 
to apply at one and the same time to the continental shelf and to 
the superjacent water column can only be carried out by the appli­
cation of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give 
preferential treatment to one of these two objects to the detriment 
of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable 
to the division of either of them. In that regard, moreover, it can 
be foreseen that with the gradual adoption by the majority of mar­
itime States of an exclusive economic zone and, consequently, an 
increasingly general demand for single delimitation, so as to avoid 
as far as possible the disadvantages inherent in plurality of separate 
delimitations, preference will henceforth inevitably be given to 
criteria that, because of their more neutral character, are best suit­
ed for use in a multi-purpose delimitation.'' H 
In the Chamber's view, criteria derived from geography, pos:;essed a 
''neutral character" and therefore appropriately applicable. In fact, its basic 
choice favoured a criterion which in principle, while having regard to the spe­
cial circumstances of the Case, aimed at "an equal division of areas whert> 
the maritime projections of the coasts of the States between which delimitation 
is to be effected converge and overlap.'' t� This criterion was not rigid, it 
stated, and certain corrections to some effects of its application, through the 
use of auxiliary criteria, may not be unreasonable H 
39. Ibid.
4-0. Ibid. 
'' Having regard to the special characteristics of the area, the aux­
iliary criterion which the Chamber has particularly in mind is that 
whereby a fair measure of weight should be given to a by no means 
negligible difference within the delimitation area between the lengths 
of the respective coasthnes of the countries concerned. It also has 
in mind the likewise auxiliary criterion whereby it is held equitable 
4-1. Ibid., para. 194-.
42. Ibid .. para. 195. 
-n. Ibid .. para. 196. 
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partially to correct any effect of applying the basic criterion that 
would result in cutting off one coastline, or part of it, from its ap­
propriate projection across the maritime expanses to be divided, 
or then again the criterion - it too being of an auxiliary nature -
involving the necessity of granting some effect, however limited, 
to the presence of a geographical feature such as an island or group 
of small islands lying off a coast; when strict application of the bas­
ic criterion might entail giving them full effect or, alternatively, no 
effect.'' H 
After deciding on the said criterion of division and other auxiliary criteria, 
the Chamber proceeded to consider the appropriate practical methods. These 
methods must also, it stated, be basically founded upon geography and be suita­
ble to both the sea-bed and superjacent waters. "In the outcome, therefore, 
only goemetrical methods will serve." 4" The Chamber again stressed that 
the special circumstances of the case may not warrant a strict compliance with 
the canons of geometry 46 • It referred to potential disadvantages 
inherent in any method which takes islets, rocks or low-tide elevations as 
basepoints for the drawing of a line intended to effect an equal division 47 
Similarily, the Chamber noted that whilst a method which produced a compli­
cated or even a zigzag path, may be acceptable for delimitation of the sea-bed, 
its application was less justified with respect to the water column 4H 
The Chamber's reliance on geography led it to observe that the course 
of a maritime boundary was dependant upon the coastal conkguration 49 • It 
concluded that the configuration of the Gulf of Maine coastline excluded any 
possibility of the boundary being formed by a basically unidirectional line ·,r; 
It found that the Gulf of Maine was geographically divided into two sectors. 
1n the first sector the parties' coasts were adjacent: "Accordingly ..... geogra­
phy itself demands that, whatever the practical method selected, the boundary 
should be a lateral delimitation line." ·,1 • In the second sector the parties' 
coasts were opposite: 
"It is once agai-n geography which prescribed that the delimitation 
line should rather be a median line (whether strict or 
corrected remains to be determined) for delimitation as 
between opposite coasts, and it is moreover geography yet again 
which requires that this line, given the almost parallelism of the 
two facing coasts involved, should also follow a direction practical­
ly parallel to theirs". ··2 
H. Ibid .. para. 196. 
·Vi. Ibid .. para. !99. 
46. Ibid .. para. 200. 
-t7. Ibid .. para. 201. 1·ide also para. 210. 
48. IIJicl .. para. 202. 
49. Ibid .. para. 205. 
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., para. 206. 
52. Ibid., para. 206. 
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For the first sector the Chamber found that there were no special cir­
cumstances which stood in the way of an equal· division of the overlapping 
area 53 • It noted that the application of a lateral equidistant line would not 
produce the desired result ,H . The method, it decided upon, consisted of 
drawing perpendiculars to the two basic coastal lines from the point of depar­
ture :;, , decided upon by the parties, of the maritime boundary and bisecting 
the reflex angle so formed ''6 • This method, it stated, had "the advantages 
of simplicity and clearity'' and produced '' a result which is probably as close 
as possible to an equal division of the first area to be delimited.'' ;, The 
finishing point of the first segment was automaticlaly determined by its inter­
section with the line containing the segment 38 
With respect to the second segment, the Chamber noted, that the op­
positness of the parties' coasts called for the application of a median line which 
had to be corrected to take into account the difference in the lenght of the respec­
tive coastlines 59 , and the presence of Seal Island 60• 
The third segment drawn by the Chamber concerned the area which lies 
outside and over against the Gulf of Maine. Consequently, it observed, that 
there was "no point of reference outside the actual shores of the Gulf, that 
can serve as a basis for carrying out the final operation required ,;i • Under 
these circumstances, the Chamber felt that the only practical method which 
could be considered was a geometrical one. It therefore decided to draw a per­
pendicular to the closing line of the Gulf as the third point of the bound­
ary 62• The Chamber obersved that its third segment had practically the same 
orientation as that given by the parties themselves ,;:; . The starting point of 
this segment was deemed to be its intersection with the end of the second seg­
ment ,;i, whilst its finishing point was to coincide with the last point the said 
perpendicular reaches within the parties' overlapping 200-n.m. zones ,;:, . 
Recalling the fundamental norm that it was bound to reach an equita­
ble result, the Chamber applied this test to the boundary it drew ,; . . With 
respect to the first two segments, the Chamber felt, that such a verification 
was not "absolutely necessary" as their parameters had been determined by 
geography ,;; . It was with regard to the third segment that such a verification 
53. Ibid .. para. 209
54. Ibid., paras. 210-211. 
55. The Judgement refers to this point of departure as Point A; ibid., para. 20. 
56. Ibid., para. 213. 
57. lbid.,para. 213. 
58. Ibid., para. 214. 
59. Ibid., paras. 218, 221, 222. 
60. Ibid., para. 222. 
61. lvid .. para. 224-. 
ti2. Ibid. 
(i:l. Ibid .. para. :22:i. 
ti-!. Ibid .. paras. 226, 227. 
(i.i. li>icl.. para. :228. 
ti6. Ibid .. para. :2:Hl. 
ti7. lliicl..para.231. 
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was called for particularly as it transversed the Georges Bank which was 
the real subject of the dispute. In view of its living and non-living resources,
it" felt the need to examine whether, apart from factors provided by geogra­
phy, others had to be taken into account 
68 
In this respect, the Chamber noted that for the United States, the deci­
sive factor was its long history of fishing and maritime activities in the
area 69 • Canada, on its part, gave more importance to the socio-economic
factors, such as the maintenance of the existing fishing patterns which were
vital to the coastal communities 
70 
• The Chamber was unable to take these
circumstances into account 
71 
• In its view:
''legitimate scruple lies rather ip concern lest the overall result even 
though achieved through the application of equitable criteria and 
the use of appropriate methods for giving them concrete effect should 
unexpectedly be revealed as radically unequitable that is to say, 
as likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and 
economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned. '/2 
It concluded that no such danger existed with respect to the third segment 73 
The Chamber's preference for a "neutral" criteria to the exclusion of 
other criteria, which whilst "relevant" were not "neutral" as they were ex­
clusively bound up with either the sea-bed or superjacent waters, is not difficult 
to understand particularly in view of the parties' insistence that a single mari­
time boundary was to be drawn. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that its 
formula is a weak one. One of its main deficiencies results from the fact that 
certain criteria, however equitable in themselves, will not be considered or ap­
plied. There can, for example, be no doubt that a criterion based on the respect 
for the unity of ecosystems or ecological regimes may be extremely appropri­
ate to the delimitation of the superjacent waters where fisheries are an impor­
tant element. If the Chamber's formula is used,this criterion will not generally 
be taken into account as it bears little or no relevance to the Shelf's delimita­
tion. The possibility, it i� submitted, that such criteria are not given any weight 
may prevent States from insisting upon a single maritime boundary when refer­
ring their delimitation disputes to third party settlement. 
IV. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award
On February 14, 1985 the Arbitral Tribunal established by Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau delivered its Award on the maritime boundary delimiting the 
68. Ibid .. para. 232. 
69. Ibid .. para. 233. 
70. Ibid .. para. 234.
71. Ibid., paras. 235, 236. 
72. Ibid .. para. 237.
73. Ibid., paras. 238-241.
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parties' territorial seas, E. E. Z' s and shelves. The first question submitted to 
the Tribunal was whether a Convention of May 12, 1886 between France and 
Portugal fixed the maritime boundary between their possessions in West Afn­
ca ;4 • In a second related question, the Tribunal was asked what was the le­
gal significance of the travaux preparatoires of the 1886 Convention for the 
purpose of interpreting it 75 • The Tribunal, after examining the two ques­
tions, concluded that the 1886 Convention, and in particular the line represent­
ing the "southern limit" of the area demarcated therein, did not fix any mari­
time boundary between the French and Protuguese possessions 76 
The Tribunal then proceeded to answer the final question which requested 
it to determine the course of a single line delimiting the territorial waters, 
E.E.Z's and shelves. At the outset the Tribunal felt it necessary to note, as 
the Chamber did in its 1984 Judgment n, that in cases concerning maritime 
delimitation customary law provides only a few basic legal principles which 
lay down guidelines to be followed with a view to achieving an essential obJec­
tive 78 • In the particular case to be decided: 
"Le but essentiel que se fixe le Tribunal consiste a aboutir a une 
solution equitable en se referant aux termes des articles 7 4, 
paragraphe 1, et 83, paragraphe 1, de la convention du 10 
decembre 1982 sur le droit de la mer. C 'est la une regle de droit 
international reconnue par le Parties et qui s'imbpose au Tribunal. 
Mais son application au cas d'espece necessite le recours a des 
facteurs et !'application de methodes dont le choix releve fu pouvoir 
du Tribunal. Cela ne signifie pas toutefois que le Tribunal soit dote 
d'un pouvoir discretionnaire OU soit habilite a decider ex aequo et
bono. Il ne s'appuiera que sur des considerations de droit." 79 
The factors and methods used, it noted, must be founded in law even though 
they are derived from physical, mathematical, historical, political, economic 
or other data ao . However, there were no limits to their number, and none 
were obligatory on the Tribunal for every case concerning delimitation was 
umque. HI 
In order to place a delimitation on an equitable and objective basis, the 
Tribunal felt that it should make every effort possible to ensure that each party 
controls the maritime areas situated in front of its coast and in their vicin­
ity 82 • In this respect, it found that an important factor was the configuration 
and direction of the parties' coastlines, including the coastal islands of the area 
and the Bijagos archipelago wi 
74. Maritime Boundary Award (1985), para. 1�
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., paras. 44 - 85. 
77. I.C.J. Reports (1984), para. 81. 
78. Maritime Bounda1T Award (1985), para. 88. 
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., para. 89. 
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., para. 92. 
83. Ibid., para. 98. 
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With respect to the applicable methods, the Tribunal held that the 
equidistance method enjoyed no priority nor was it obligatory but was one of 
a number of methods _which could be applied 84 • Nevertheless, it was pre­
pared to recognize its scientific character and the relative ease with which it 
could be applied 85 • The method to be used, in its view, should have no other 
goal but the division of the maritime areas and territories subject to the juris­
diction of different States by seeking to apply objective factors which allow the 
attainment of an equitable result. 
"Une telle demarche exclut tout recours a une methode choisie a 
priori. Elle exige au contraire un raisonnement juridique objectif 
et la methode a utiliser ne peut qu'en etre le resultat. Toutefois 
le Tribunal devra examiner les lignes proposees par les Parties et 
discutees par elles, conformement a une bonne administration de 
la Justice.'' 87 
The Tribunal noted that, taken together, the coasts of the parties includ­
ing islands, were concave 88 • The application of the equidistance method in 
this situation, the Chamber observed, would cut off Guinea's maritime area 
in front of its coasts and would tend to enclave it between the maritime areas 
apertaining to Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone tt•i 
Whilst confirming its conclusion that the ''southern limit'', found in Ar­
ticle 1 of the 1886 Convention, did not represent a general maritime bound­
ary, the Tribunal did no� discard it as completely irrelevant � . In its view 
the said limit could be used, from the extremity of the land boundary as far as 
the elevation of the Guinean island of Alcatraz, to obtain an "equitable 
result"'11 • In this respect, the Tribunal referred to the Tunisia/Libya judg­
ment which noted that one of "the relevant circumstances which
the area" is "the position of the land frontier, or more precisely the position 
of its intersection with the coastline, to be taken into account" •n • The em­
ployment of the "southern limit" beyond the island of Alcatraz would however, 
the Tribunal noted, produce a cut-off effect and might well lead to an "en­
clavement" which, in this case, would operate against Guinea-Bissau '11 • 
Under these circumstances, the Tribunal felt that it should not limit it­
self to the "short coast" but that it should consider the "long coast" by focus­
ing upon the entire West African region ,,., . In its view, such an exercise led 
84. Ibid .. para. 102.
85. Ibid. 
8b. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid .. para. 103.
89. Ibid .. para. 104.
90. Ibid .. para. 106.
91. Ibid .. para. 107.
92. Ibid .. para. 106.
93. I.CJ. Reports (1982), para. 81.
9-l. .\Iaritime B0unda1T A.11ard (1985), para. 107. 
95. Ibid .. para. 108. 
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to the conclusion that an equitable delimitation had to be carried out by fol­
lowing a direction which takes overall account of the convex shape of the West 
African coastline, and would be adaptable to the pattern of present or future 
delimitations in the regions 96 
In considering which method best took into account the general configu-
ration of the West African coastline, the Tribunal stated: 
"Un second systeme consisterait a utiliser la facade maritime et 
a choisir pour cela une ligne droite reliant deux points cotiers sur 
le continent. Cela aurait l'avantage de donner plus d'importance 
a !'orientation generale du littoral, au risque de partir d'une droite 
traversant les 11es et meme empietant sur le continent'.''" 
It felt that a straight line proceeding from Almadies Point in Senegal to 
Cape Shilling in Sierra Leone "traduit cette circonstance avec plus de 
fidelite' '118 • Accordingly an equitable solution, the Tribunal concluded, would 
be derived by pursuing the "southern limit" up to 12-n.m. west of the island 
of Alcatraz, and then, to the south west, a straight line with a bearing of 236°, 
grosso modo perpendicular to the Almadies/Shilling line 99 
'' Le Tribunal constate que pareille ligne reduirait au minimum les 
risques d'enclavement ....... " 100 • 
Having decided upon a boundary, the Chamber examined whether cer­
tain circumstances invoked by the parties should effect its decision. The first 
circumstance related to the concept of natural prolongation. Whilst referring 
to the shelf definition found in Article 7 6 ( 1) of the 1982 Convention u n, the 
Tribunal found that there was no possibility of invoking any features based 
on the said concept since the shelves of the parties comprised a single �hole, 
without sufficiently marked divisions 10� 
Proportionality between the extent of maritime areas to be allocated and 
the length of the coastlines 1°', was another circumstance which the Tribunal 
felt it had to consider 101 • In the particular case, however, it concluded that 
the "regle" of proportionality should not enable either party to claim any ad­
ditional advantage, since, the fact that the islands had been taken into account 
%. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
Ibid. 
Ibid .. 
Ibid .. 
Ibid .. 
Ibicl. 
para. 110. 
para, 110. 
para. 111. 
IO 1. This prm·ision adopts the natural prolongation concept as a criterion for determining the 
1·xtcnt of the Shelf. It also adopts the 200-nautical miles distance as an alternative criteria. 
102 .\faririmc Bcmndan· An·ard (1985) paras. 113 - 117. 
l\U. Till' Tribunal did not c•ri:itt.kr prnportionality between the land mass and the extenc of 
lll,triti111c an·;i, to be allocated as constituting a reln·ant circumstance in the case. ibid ..
para. 11<1. 
10-t. Ibicl .. par,1 1 IB. 
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resulted in the coasts of the two States being considered by the Tribunal as 
having the same lenght 10j 
Neither did the Tribunal find that any of the economic 
circumstances invoked by the parties were of a sufficiently durable nature to 
be taken into account for delimitation purposes 106 • Finally, the Tribunal con­
sidered circumstances derived from Security. The implications of this circum­
stance, it felt, were already resolved by the fact that in proposing its solution, 
the Tribunal had paid attention to ensure that each State controls the mari­
time territories situated in front of its coasts and in their vicinity 107 
As was predicted by the Chamber 108, the Arbitral Tribunal preferred 
criteria and methods which because of their "neutral" character were appropri­
ate for the delimitation of both the sea-bed and the superjacent waters. In this 
respect, its Award chimes with the 1984 Judgment. Indeed, it seems safe to 
assert that, at least in cases where the parties request a single boundary, the 
adjudicator will rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the geographical factors and 
coastal configurations of the case. 
In this respect, States may find it hazardous to impose upon the adjudi­
cator the obligation to draw a single maritime boundary. For in doing so they 
risk certain factors, even though relevant, not being considered let alone being 
given any weight in the delimitation process. It is not difficult to agree with 
Judge Gros in his Dissenting Opinion to the Gulf of Maine Judgment when 
he said. 
'' ...... after having discarded the continental shelf, to strike an equal· 
balance according to the logic of the Judgment, one must also ex­
clude the fisheries; it is a sea deprived of all meaning, an empty 
sea, which is to be divided - which was not among the Parties' 
themes:' 111'' 
V. State Practice
There is clear evidence of a growing State practice favouring the estab­
lish mcn t of a single maritime boundary 1111 • In fact, the large majority of 
delimitation agreements concluded in the last five years have adopted such a 
!(Li. l/Jid .. para. 120. 
106. Ibid., paras. 121 · 123. 
lfl7. l/1id .. para. 124-. 
108. I.CJ. Reports (1984), para. 194. 
109. J.C.}. Reports (l(lB4). pp. %8. para. 14; ,·ide also Bowett, D.: Exploitation of Mineral 
Rcsm11n·s ancl rhc C:onrinental Shelf a paper presented to the Rome Conference. 
110. \ 'idc ..\nnex II for a list of agreements establishing a single maritime boundary. Other ear· 
ly examples are: the 1952 Agreement on the Maritime Zone between Chile and Ecuador, 
Peru: and the 1960 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal: Exchange of Notes regarding the Maritime 
Houndar_l'. 
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boundary. The 1976 India/Sri Lanka Agreement, for example, provides for 
a single boundary with each part having: 
'' sovereign and exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf and 
the exclusive economic zone as well as over their resources, whether 
living or non-living, falling on its own side of the boundary''. 
The United States has established common maritime boundaries with 
Cuba (1977), Venezuela (1978), Mexico (1978), Cook Islands (1980), and New 
Zealand (1980). The Agreement with Cuba, for example, states that either party 
will not '' claim or exercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the waters or 
sea-bed and subsoil," beyond their side of the boundary 111 • 
France has concluded a number of single maritime boundary agreements: 
Mauritius (1980), Tonga (1980), Venezuela (1980), Brazil (1981), Saint 
L�cia (1981), Australia (1982), Fiji (1983). The France/Tonga Treaty Estab­
lishing a Maritime Boundary, for example, delimits the parties E.E.Z.s: Arti­
cle I states 
'' La linge de delimitation entre la zone economique de la Repub­
lique fran�aise an large de Wallis et Futuna et la zone economique 
esclusive de Tonga est la ligne mediane ou d'equidistance" 112 • 
In view of this widespread State practice favouring a single maritime bound­
ary, it is reasonable to ask whether under customary law States are now ob­
liged to establish such a boundary? Is it permissible for States to delimit their 
shelf and its superjacent water by two boundaries which may not be 
coincidental? 
It is submitted that whilst the advantages of a single maritime boundary 
are great 11:1 , there is no obligation upon States to establish such a boundary. 
As has been seen above, particularly when discussing the Gulf of Maine judg­
ment 114 , there are certain factors which might influence the Shelf boundary 
but not the E.E.Z. boundary and vice-versa. Criteria derived from geological 
or geomorphological considerations may be relevant to the delimitation of the 
Shelf, but are unlikely to be relevant in the delimitation of the E.E.Z. 
Faced with this problem, the adjudicator has, at least, two possible 
options. The first is that adopted by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine 
case and the Arbitral Tribunal inthe Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case. It does 
not give any consideration to criteria or methods which are derived 
from factors appertaining solely to the delimitation of the sea-bed or the water-
111. . .\rt. 111. X\'11 International Legal .\faterials (1978), pp. 110 -: for an interesting com­
mentary on the C.S. maritime boundarit·s by two lawyers who were invoh·ed in the C.S. 
maritime boundan· programme ,·ide. Feldman. '.\1.B .. and Colson D. ; "The Maritime 
Boundaries of rhe Cnited Stares"' 75 A..J.l.L. (1981). pp. 729 et. seq.
11:2 . .Journal 0/Jicid de la Rcp11bliq11t· Franriase. 11 .Januarv 1980. 
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column. The criteria or methods to be applied must be "neutral", that is they 
must be applicable to the delimitation of both elements. This approach, 
however, neglects criteria or methods which are only relevant to the delimita­
tion of one of the above-mentioned elements. Despite its weakness, this option 
is not difficult to understand, if the parties to a dispute insist on a single mari­
time boundary. 
If the parties do not exclude the possibility of two seperate boundaries, 
then the adjudicator has another option m . Where there exist circumstances 
which are only related to either the delimitation of the sea-bed or that of the 
water column, the adjudicator may take them into consideration, if they are 
relevant, even though this may produce two different boundaries. This approach 
enables the adjudicator to consider all equitable considerations in order to ef­
fect an equitable delimitation. 
If the adjucator decides that the sea-bed boundary and the water-column 
boundary should not be coincidental, then whilst State A may have jurisdic­
tion over the Shelf, State B would enjoy jurisdiction of the superjacent waters. 
It is not difficult to imagine the practical and adminsitrative problems. 
that could arise in such cases, particularly as the exploitation of sea-bed resources 
often involves the super:jacent waters. Despite these problems, States may prefer 
this approach particularly if it takes into account all the relevant considera­
tions raised by the parties. 
Indeed, it is possible to find at.least one example of this approach in State 
pracitice. The 1918 Treaty Between Australia and Papua New Guinea Con­
cerning the Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the 
Two Countries, including the Area known as Torres Strait, and Related Mat­
ters did not establish a Shelf boundary which was identical with that of the 
water-column 116 • This approach was adopted because the parties wanted to 
take into account socio-economic considerations which were relevant to the 
delimitation of the water-column but not to that of the sea-bed 117 
The Preamble of the Treaty, in fact, refers to, inter alia, the "importance 
of protecting the traditional way of life and livelihood of Australians who are 
Torres Strait Islanders and of Papua New Guineas who live in the coastal 
area of Papua New Guinea in and adjacent to the Torres Strait;". The sea­
bed boundary coincides with the water-column boundary except in the central 
Torres Strait. 
113. Professor D. Bowett states: " ..... that a coincidence of shelf and E.E.Z. boundaries is much 
more practical, and more easily administered, so that the presumption must be for an identity 
of boundaries.": The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law ( 1979), p. 189 
114. Supra, Section 111. 
115. It is of course possible for the sea-bed boundary to be only partly coincidental with the
water-column boundary.
116. 18 December, 1978, VIII New Directions in the Law of the Sea (1980) (Oceana), pp. 216
et seq. 
117. Vide, further Burnmester, H. : "The Torres Strait Treaty : Ocean Boundary Delimita-
tion by Agreement", 76 A.J.I.L. (1982) pp. 321 et seq. 
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In the area where jurisdications overlap, the parties agreed to consult 
each other only on measures not directly related to the sea-bed's control · of 
fisheries 118 • Thus jurisdiction over an oil-rig is enjoyed only by the State with 
jurisdiction over the sea-bed. This Treaty, demonstrates that States do not con­
sider that under international law a single maritime boundary is compulsory. 
Furthermore, it also shows that it is possible for States to devise legal mechan­
isms which will facilitate the co-existance of different overlapping national 
jurisdictions. 
VI. Conclusions
There can be little doubt that a single maritime boundary offers both
practical and administrative advantages. Indeed, it is difficult to disagree with 
the view that a presumption exists in favour of such a boundary. However, 
this does not mean that it is obligatory upon States wishing to delimit their 
sea-bed and the superjacent waters. 
States are free to establish different boundaries for the sea-bed and the 
superjacent waters. Unless this were so, problems would arise with respect to 
established shelf boundaries. It would seem unreasonable to require the water­
column boundary to automatically follow a boundary which may be a reflec­
tion of considerations which are relevant only to the delimitation of the Shelf. 
In view of the approach by the 1984 Gulf of Maine judgment - which 
was followed in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau award, - States would be well­
advised not to insist upon a single maritime boundary when referring their 
disputes to third party settlement. By requiring the adjudicator to decide upon 
a single maritime boundary, they risk the exclusion of considerations - which 
may be relevant but which do not possess a ''neutral'' character - from delimi­
tation process. The existance of the ''Torres Strait Treaty'' demonstrates that 
it is possible to devise legal mechanism to deal with the practical and adminis­
trative problems which may occur when different national jurisdictions overlap. 
118. Vide, Art., 4(3) and (4)-
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ANNEX I 
Table of Exlusive Exonomic Zone Claimants 
1. Antigua and Barbuda
2. Bangladesh
3. Barbados
4. Burma
5. Cape Verde
6. China (R.)
7. Colombia
8. Comoros
9. Cook Islands
10. Costa Rica
11. Cuba
12. Democratic Kampuchea
13. Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
14. Democratic Yemen
15. Djbouti
16. Dominica
17. Dominican Republic
18. Equatorial Guinea
19. Fiji
20. France
21. Grenada
22. Guatemala
23. Guinea
24. Guinea Bissau
25. Guyana
26. Haiti
27. Honduras
28. Iceland
29. India
30. Indonesia
31. Ivory Coast
32. Kenya
33. Kiribati
34. Madagascar
35. Malaysia
36. Maldives
37. Mauritania
38. Mauritius
39. Mexico
40. Morocco
41. Mozambique
42. New Zealand
43. Nigeria
44. Niue
45. Norway
46. Oman
4 7. Pakistan
48. Philippines
49. Portugal
50. Qatar
51. St. Christopher and Nevis
52. St. Lucia
53. St. Vincent and
the Grenadines
54. Sao Tome and Principe
55. Seychelles
56. Solomon Island ** 
57. Spain
58. Sri Lanka
59. Suriname
60. Thailand
61. Togo
62. Tonga **
63. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
65. United States
66.Vanuatu
67. Venezuela
68. Vietnam
69. Western Samoa.
•• Legislation has been enacted but is not yet in force. 
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Annex II 
Talbe of Single Maritime Boundary Agreements 
1972 
Brazil / Uruguay 
1973 
Austrialia / Indonesia 
1974 
India / Sri Lanka 
1975 
Gambia / Senegal 
Colombia / Ecuador 
1976 
India / Sri Lanka 
India / Sri Lanka 
India / Maldives 
1977 
Colombia I Costa Rica 
Cuba/ Haiti 
Cuba / United States 
Agreement on the Maritime Boundary, 21 July 
1 9 7 2  
Agreement concerning certain Boundaries be­
tween Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, 12 
February 1973 
Agreement on the Boundary in Historic Waters, 
26 - 28 June 1984 
Agreement Delimiting Maritime Boundaries in 
the North Atlantic Ocean, 4 June 1975 
Maritime Boundary Agreement, 23 August 1975 
Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf 
of Manaar and the Bay of Bengal and Related 
Matters, 23 March 1976 
Supplementary Agreement on the Extension of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Manaar from 
the Position 13m to the Trijunction point between 
India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives 22 November 
1976 
Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime 
Boundary in the Arabian Sea, 28 December 1976. 
Treaty on Delimitation of Marine and Sub-marine 
Areas and Maritime Cooperation, 17 March 1977 
Agreement regarding the Delimitation of the Mar­
itime Boundaries, 27 October 1977 
Maritime Boundary Agreement, 16 December 
1977 
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1978 
Colombia / Dominican 
Republic 
Colombia / Haiti 
United States / 
Venezuela 
Netherlands 
Antilles / Venezuela 
Mexico / United States 
Colombia / Panama 
1979 
pomincian Republic / 
Venezuela 
1980 
France / Tonga 
Costa Rica / Panama 
France / Mauritius 
Cook Islands / 
United States 
France / Venezuela 
Burma/ Thailand 
New Zealand / United 
States 
Agreement on the Declaration of Marine and Sub­
marine Areas and Maritime Cooperation, 
13, January 1978 
Agreement on Maritime Limits, 18 February 1978_ 
Maritime Boundary Treaty, 28 March 1978 
Agreement on the Maritime Boundary, 
31 March 1978 
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, 4 May 1978. 
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, 3 November 1978. 
Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and 
Submarine Areas, 3 March 1979 
Treaty Establishing a Maritime Boundary 
between Tonga and Wallis and Futuna, 11 Janu­
ary 1980. 
Treaty concerning Delimitation of Marine Areas 
and Maritime Cooperation, 2 February 1980 
Convention on the Delimitation of the French and 
Mauritian Economic Zones between the Island of 
Reunion and Mauritius , 2 April 1980 
Treaty on Friendship and Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary, 11 June 1980 
Maritime Delimitation Treaty, 17 July 1980 
Agreement on the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Andaman Sea, 25 July 1980 
Treaty on the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary between the United States and Tokelau, 
2 December 1980 
28 
1981 
France / St. Lucia 
France / Brazil 
1982 
Australia / France 
(New Caledonia) 
1983 
Fiji /France 
1984 
Argentina / Chile 
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Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime 
Areas, 4 March 1981 
Maritime Delimitation Treaty, 30 January 1981 
Maritime Delimitation Agreement, 9 January 
1982 
Maritime Delimitation Agreement, 13 January 
1983 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 18 October 1984. 
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